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ABSTRACT

The United States has led the effort to promote peaceful use of nuclear power
amongst states actively utilizing it as well as those looking to deploy the technology in
the near future. With the attraction being demonstrated by various countries towards
nuclear power comes the concern that a nation may have military aspirations for the use
of nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established
nuclear safeguard protocols and procedures to mitigate nuclear proliferation. The work
herein proposed a strategy to further enhance existing safeguard protocols by considering
safeguard in nuclear fuel design. The strategy involved the use of radionuclides to profile
nuclear fuels. Six radionuclides were selected as identifier materials. The decay and
transmutation of these radionuclides were analyzed in reactor operation environment.
MCNPX was used to simulate a reactor core. The perturbation in reactivity of the core
due to the loading of the radionuclides was insignificant. The maximum positive and
negative reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 ± 0.00256
and at day 2000 with -0.00441 ± 0.00249, respectively. The mass of the radionuclides
were practically unaffected by transmutation in the core; the change in radionuclide
inventory was dominated by natural decay.

The maximum material lost due to

transmutation was 1.17% in Eu154. Extraneous signals from fission products identical to
the radionuclide compromised the identifier signals. Eu154 saw a maximum intensity
change at EOC and 30 days post-irradiation of 1260% and 4545%, respectively. Cs137
saw a minimum change of 12% and 89%, respectively. Mitigation of the extraneous
signals is cardinal to the success of the proposed strategy. The predictability of natural
decay provides a basis for the characterization of the signals from the radionuclide.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND
Nuclear energy technology is becoming very attractive to many countries around
the world. The promise of energy security and reduced reliance on fossil fuel is a major
driver for the renewed interest in nuclear energy. The attraction to this technology is a
positive development with regards to the expansion of the industry. However, it also
creates concerns of abuse from countries with clandestine intentions.
There has been consideration that countries with genuine interest in pursuing
nuclear technology for peaceful application be supported by countries with the technical
know-how. Under this proposal, countries seeking nuclear energy (receiving state) will
be supplied with nuclear reactors appropriate for the desired purpose [1][2]. The
technology supplier would be responsible for the installation, maintenance and retrieval
of the nuclear components at the end of life. In the case of a power reactor, retrieval of
spent fuel may not be immediate. The spent fuel will require some cooling time. During
the cooling period, it is important to safeguard the spent fuel inventory.

This is

particularly true in a situation where the fuel is entrusted to the receiving state during the
cooling period. Such trust implicitly assumes that the receiving state will keep watch
over the inventory, and that it will not attempt a diversion of the spent fuel for nuclear
proliferation and arms development purposes.
1.1.1 Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguard. At the end of World War II,
the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world’s superpowers.
Competition arose among these two powers and their allies. With this competition was
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the birth of the Nuclear Arms Race. During this time, each nation was stockpiling
nuclear weapons and producing nuclear warheads with the capability to totally annihilate
the other; which led to a situation termed Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) because an
attack on the enemy would ensure a counterattack [3]. This stalemate helped keep each
side from attacking the other. The rest of the world saw the delicate relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union, and feared that having more nuclear states would
be even less secure. Due to this concern, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was
introduced and opened for signatures in 1968. The purpose of the NPT was to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapon technology to other nations [4]. It became necessary to
develop safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear safeguards are ways to ensure that non nuclear weapon states are not
using their nuclear material for weapons proliferation [5]. By increasing the likelihood of
early detection, safeguards deter the non nuclear state from using nuclear material for
nefarious purposes. Current safeguard measures include a full range inspection by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear facility operators are required to
keep detailed, accurate records of the movement of nuclear materials. Video surveillance
and on-site inspections are also used to ensure the location of the nuclear fuel [5]. The
IAEA has recently started a push towards Safeguard-by-Design (SBD) for new nuclear
facilities.

The IAEA describes the SBD approach as one in which “international

safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the
initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning”. The goal
is to implement the international safeguards more effectively and efficiently [6]. This
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also may include designing the safeguard as part of the nuclear material itself. In the case
of power reactors, the safeguard could be designed as part of the fuel.
1.1.2 Special Nuclear Materials Handling in Light Water Reactor (LWR)
Systems. Light water reactors (LWRs) generally use uranium as its fuel. Before going
through the core of a LWR, the uranium has to be enriched and fabricated into fuel. It is
necessary that the uranium enrichment is between 2% and 4% by weight of U235. After
enrichment, the uranium is fabricated into ceramic fuel pellets and placed in the fuel rods
which are then arranged in a fuel assembly [7]. The fuel is then placed in the core and
burned, after which the spent fuel would be taken out of the core and placed in an on-site
water pool to cool for as long as 20 years before final disposal [7]. In the case of a nation
seeking to pursue peaceful use of nuclear power, the enriched fuel will be provided to the
nation by an existing nuclear state. However, the nation would be responsible for storing
and safeguarding the spent fuel during the cooling period. During this nuclear fuel cycle,
a nation intent on diverting fuel for proliferation or a would-be rogue nation has
opportunities to steal the fuel. Nations with such clandestine intent are not likely to
engage in overt diversion of fuel material due to the current safeguards in place.
However, covert diversion would be likely. Such states would be more likely to avoid
suspicion by stealing a few fuel rods from an assembly for diversion if they are secretly
pursuing nuclear proliferation.
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1.1.3 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Systems. Of the 437 power reactors
in the world, 357 of those are LWRs [7][8]. Out of the LWRs, there are 273 pressurized
water reactors (PWRs) [8]. After World War II, research was being conducted in the use
of nuclear technology in power production and naval propulsion. The United States
focused on LWR designs which led to the development of the PWR design [9]. The
PWR is characterized by having a primary and secondary loop.

The primary loop

contains pressurized water which goes through the core and contains some radioactivity.
The secondary loop contains non radioactive water and steam which turns the turbines.
Both loops meet in the steam generator where the heat from the water in the primary loop
is transferred to the water in the secondary loop which generate steam [7]. A nation
looking to embrace nuclear power would most likely start with a PWR system as it is the
most established of all reactor designs. Moreover, the abundance of this reactor type
makes the PWR system a candidate in the development of a strategy that will enhance
nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation.
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH
The objective of this project is to explore the viability of using certain
radionuclides for unique identification of nuclear fuels from fabrication to disposal or
reprocessing. This effort is focused on the implementation of an identification strategy in
PWR fuel assemblies. Particularly in a case where the fuels are supplied to a state that is
apparently pursuing nuclear power for peaceful use, it is nearly impossible to accurately
judge the intentions of such state. However, activities indicative of adverse use of
nuclear materials could be monitored in a timely manner.

To achieve this, it is

imperative to develop strategies that significantly improve material accountancy. The
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approach proposed in this project is to have the fuel safeguard designed as part of the fuel
at the time of fabrication. This approach seeks to minimize reliance on overlaid Material
Control & Accountancy (MC&A) strategies such as number tags, video surveillance, and
physical inspection. Through this strategy, a missing fuel assembly or one that has been
tampered with would be identified within reasonable time before any diversion could
result in special material recovery by the perpetrators. In order to achieve the objective
stated above, the following tasks were completed:
1. Selection criteria for candidate radionuclides that would be effective tracers and
signal generators for fuel tagging in this strategy
2. Determination of the effectiveness of tagging materials particularly during reactor
operation and post irradiation.
3. Determination of the impact of tagging materials on current reactor operation and
safety standards.
The first task was accomplished by establishing selection criteria based on
desirable properties of a candidate radionuclide and the selection was made through the
review of nuclear data files and cross sections.

The second and third tasks were

completed through the use of Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP). The
code was used to run the simulations of a PWR core with the nuclear safeguard designed
as part of the fuel. The reactor core was modeled based on a Westinghouse AP1000 core
configuration, which was designed to operate at a temperature and pressure of 573K and
155 bars, respectively. It should be noted that unlike AP1000, the fresh fuel composition
in the PWR modeled was uniform core-wide at 5 percent

235

U enrichment. The reactor
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criticality calculations were performed using MCNP5 and core burn up calculations were
performed with MCNPX2.7.0. The core was run at a constant power of 1100 MW.[10]
The uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel and the identifier were burned in the core for a total of
2200 days. There were nine time steps of 200 days and four time steps of 100 days.
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2. DETERMINATION OF TAGGING RADIONUCLIDES

The proposed strategy involved the use of radionuclides in the tagging and
monitoring of nuclear fuel assemblies. Through the radionuclide tags, any assembly
would be uniquely identified and its history could be retraced. For such a strategy to be
successful, the nature and/or denaturing of the radionuclide must lend itself to accurate
profiling. The buildup or depletion of signals generated by these radionuclides must be
traceable.

In this method, combinations of concentrations, concentration changes,

activity ratios and other metrics could be used to establish unique tags to any fuel
assembly being supplied to a receiving state. In this work the modalities for profiling the
radionuclides over time is proposed. It should be noted that the development of such
metrics is outside the scope of this work.
2.1 SELECTION CRITERIA
As part of the ultimate goal of nuclear fuel identification and monitoring, a
preliminary investigation was performed into radionuclides that may be useful in the
implementation of the strategy.

The approach involved selection of candidate

radionuclides out of over 200 from the chart of nuclides [11]. The selection criteria
include:
•

Non-actinide: Actinides exhibit complex behavior during irradiation.

•

Gamma signature: The potential unique identifier should emit a unique
signal that can be detected. In this case, unique is defined as the ease of
positive detection by a radiation detector. It is important that no two
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selected radionuclides have gamma energies close to each other. This will
facilitate the resolution of the detected signals from the radionuclides.
•

Medium to long half-life: A radioactive sample would decay completely in
about 10 half-lives. Hence half-life of 10 years or more is desirable.

•

Availability naturally or through synthesis:

It is imperative that the

radionuclide can be economically produced.
•

High melting point: The physical form of the radionuclide needs to be
preserved under reactor operating conditions.

•

Small absorption cross section: Low cross section ensures that the
radionuclide is not compromised via transmutation in the reactor
environment.

2.2 SELECTED TAGGING MATERIAL
Table 2.1 provides the list of radionuclides that could potentially be used as the
unique identifier. Seven radionuclides have been selected for the purpose of
identification based on the criteria listed earlier. Ag108m was deleted from the list of
potential identifiers due to its cross-section information’s absence in the MCNP Data
Libraries.

2.3 LIMITATIONS OF SELECTED MATERIAL
Some of these nuclides did not meet all the desired criteria. Table 2.2 shows a
check list of the criteria each radionuclide met. Cs-137 has a very low melting point.
This can be remedied by making the identifier a Cesium compound. An example is
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Cesium Chromate (IV) which has a melting point of 982°C. All other radionuclides with
melting point below 900°C could also be used in forms with high melting point.
Examples include Barium Hexaboride and Europium Boride with melting point of
2070°C and 2600°C, respectively.

Table 2.1.List of potential radionuclides for the unique identifier
*: Value taken from JEFF 3.0/A Data
Nuclide

Nb94

T1/2
(years)
4

2.0x10

Gamma
Emission
(keV)

871.1
702.6

σ γ (barns)
@
0.0253eV

Melting
Point (°C)

15.8

2477

50.7*

962

0.25

28.5

2.8

727

12,796

822

1,353

822

3,609

1472

722.9
Ag108m

420

433.9
614.3

Cs137

30.07

Ba133

10.53

661.7
283.4
365
81
302.9
121.8

Eu152

13.54

1408
344.3

Eu154

8.59

123.1
1274.5
184.4

Ho166m

3

1.2x10

810.3
711.7
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Table 2.2 Checklist of the radionuclides that met each criterion
Radionuclide
Criteria
Non-Actinide

Nb94


Ag108m


Unique Gamma
Signature
Half Life (≥10
years)





High Melting
Point





Low Absorption
Cross-Section

Cs137


Ba133


















Eu152


Eu154


Ho166m









All except Cs-137 and Ba-133 have significant absorption cross section at room
temperature. Particularly for the holmium and europium nuclides, the cross sections are
large enough for the samples to be denatured in a reactor environment [11]. It may be
possible to shield these nuclides from thermal neutron absorption by encasing the finally
fabricated identifier in a neutron shield such as cadmium foil. Cadmium-113 has a cross
section of 20,600 barns which is 38% higher than that of Eu152, the largest cross section
within the chosen radionuclides. It is expected that the cadmium case would cut off the
thermal neutrons that would otherwise contribute to the transmutation of the identifiers.
Some radionuclides have gamma energies close to one another. For example, Eu152 and Eu-154 have gamma signatures of 121.8 keV and 123.1 keV, respectively.
Depending on detector resolution, these gammas may not be easily separated. However,
both nuclides have other gamma signatures that are distinct enough for facilitated proper
and unique identification. This is also the case for Nb-94, Ag-108m and Ho-166m with
gamma energies 702.6 keV, 722.9 keV and 711.7 keV, respectively [11].
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All selected nuclides except Eu-154 have half-lives greater than 10 years. Eu-154
with an 8.59 year half-life, would have measurable contribution to the identification of
the nuclear fuel for more than 50 years [11]. Hence the half-life issue does not pose a
significant adverse effect on the strategy being investigated.
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3. EFFECTIVENESS METRICS OF TAGGING MATERIAL

The two items that could compromise the effectiveness of the tagging material are
signal interference from the spent fuel and transmutation susceptibility of the identifier.
Each of these can compromise the integrity of the unique signal that is detected. It is
necessary that the identifiers do not have any negative impacts on current reactor
operations and safety standards as well. To determine the effect, it was necessary to
compare the keff of the core with the identifier and without it.
3.1

SIGNAL INTERFERENCE
The depleted fuel in the core may contain either the same radionuclides which

will be used as the identifier or different radionuclides which may have gamma
signatures that are close to that of the identifier. Therefore if the signal from the spent
fuel compromises the unique signal being emitted from the identifier, it would be difficult
to distinguish the signals that are from the unique identifier. Figure 3.1 demonstrates
how the extraneous signals from the fission products may interact with the unique signal
from the identifier. Figure 3.1a shows how the external gamma signals from the spent
fuel could contaminate the unique signal from the identifier and give an inaccurate
reading in the detector. Figure 3.1b shows how the contamination of the unique signal
could be avoided if the external signal was adequately shielded. This shielding could
take the form of distance or some other physical barrier blocking the extraneous fuel
signal.
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To determine if the unique signal is compromised by the gamma rays coming
from the depleted fuel, it was necessary to calculate the activity of each radionuclide after
each time step using equation 3.1 [12]:
    

(3.1)

where, α0 is the initial activity of the radionuclide in Becquerel (bq),
λ is the decay constant in sec-1and
t is the elapsed time in sec.
Using the F4 tally in MCNPX, the neutron flux (cm-2) is given for each expected gamma
energy from the radionuclides of the identifier.

(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1 Spent fuel signal interfering with identifier signal. (a) Photons from the
spent fuel compromising the unique signature of the identifier.
(b) Photons from the spent fuel shielded from the unique signal of the identifier.
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3.2

SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE IDENTIFIER TO TRANSMUTATION
Since the signal is dependent upon the natural decay of the identifiers, it is

important that the radionuclides are not compromised by transmutation. It is desirable
that the decay of the radionuclides is dominated by natural decay rather than neutron
absorption. To determine the dominating decay mode, the ratio of the reaction rate over
the natural decay rate was used. Equation 3.2 gives the reaction rate and equation 3.3
gives the natural decay.




   

(3.2)

where, N is the atom density of the radionuclide in atoms/cm3,
σγ is the radiative capture cross section in barns (b) and
Φ is the neutron flux is neutrons/cm2-s.




  

(3.3)

Equation 3.4 gives the ratio of the reaction rate over the decay rate.




 

 


(3.4)

If the decay ratio is greater than 1, then the decay is mostly due to the reaction
rate. If it is equal to 1, then the decay rate and reaction are equal. If it is less than 1, then
the decay is mostly due to the decay rate. It is desirable that the decay ratio is less than
one and is mostly due to natural decay.
The F4 tally multiplier in MCNPX was used to determine the reaction rate. The
atom density (N) was calculated by MCNPX from the information available in the input
file. The radiative capture cross section was obtained from the MCNP Data Libraries.
The track length flux () in cm-2 was obtained from the F4 tally. The product of the

15
output of the tally multiplier and the neutron intensity (neutrons/sec.) provides the
reaction rate in disintegrations per seconds or Becquerel (Bq).
The neutron intensity is needed to obtain the flux in the radionuclides that would
be used in the calculation of the reaction rate as can be seen in equation 3.5 [12].
  

3.5

where, I is the neutron intensity in neutrons/sec and
 is the track length flux in cm-2 from the F4 tally.
The average neutron intensity of the core was calculated in MCNPX for each time
step.
3.2.1 Uncertainty Associated with Nuclear Cross Section Data. Many nations
use their own evaluated nuclear data libraries. For example, China, Japan, and the USA
use the Chinese Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (CENDL), Japanese Evaluated Nuclear
Data Library (JENDL), and Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF), respectively. Each
library has a unique method for evaluating neutron cross sections for radionuclides which
leads to discrepancies.

Figure 3.2 shows the differences in radiative capture cross

sections from multiple data libraries. For this reason, the cross section for a radionuclide
could be different in each library. For instance, the method used to evaluate the total
cross section for cesium-137 in JENDL 4.0 was to add all the partial cross sections
together [13]. The partial cross sections, including radiative capture, were evaluated by
use of the CCONE code, a code for nuclear data evaluation [13][14]. CASTHY, a
neutron cross section statistical model, was use to evaluate the radiative capture cross
section for cesium-137 in ENDF/B-VII.0 [15][16].
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Figure 3.2 Comparative cross sections of each radionuclide from the identifier from
various nuclear data libraries from Janis-3.4.

The tracking method proposed in this paper is based off of the information from
ENDF/B VII.0 Library. The differences in cross section data for the libraries could have
an impact on simulations. Simulations using different libraries may result in various
transmutation rates for the selected tagging materials.

This is the main cause of

uncertainties in the results of simulations of this strategy. The uncertainties associated
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with the cross section data is thus propagated to the transmutation analysis for the tagging
radionuclides.

It should be noted that the cross-section for some radionuclides is

sometimes adopted from other data libraries. For this reason, some data libraries may
have the identical cross section profiles for a radionuclide. For example, ENDF/B-VII.0
used the cross-section evaluation from JENDL 3.3 for Niobium-94 [17].
3.2.2 Thermal Neutron Flux. Using MCNP5, the flux in different parts of the
core was obtained. The flux is used to determine the likelihood of the tagging material
having interactions with the thermal neutrons. Figure 3.3 shows the flux per lethargy
spectrum in the whole assembly, in the gas plenum, at the unshielded identifier location
and shielded identifier location. The thermal neutron flux in the assembly is at least two
orders of magnitude higher than the flux in the plenum. The flux at the unshielded
identifier location is about two orders of magnitudes lower than the plenum flux. This
indicates that far less thermal neutrons are getting to the identifier location then there are
in the entire assembly or plenum. It is expected that there will be little interaction with
the unshielded identifier because of the low thermal neutron flux in that location. This
means that the identifiers are less likely to undergo transmutation. The earlier suggestion
of encasing the identifiers in cadmium cover (see section 2.3) was evaluated.

The

resulting flux profile in the identifier location had the thermal neutrons completely cut-off
as shown in Figure 3.3. This is an indication of the effectiveness of a cadmium shield in
the mitigation of identifier transmutation via thermal neutron capture.
Figure 3.4 shows the cross section of each radionuclide with the flux spectrum in
the identifier location over the neutron energy spectrum. The thermal neutron flux peaks
at small neutron cross sections for Nb94, Cs137, and Ba133. Therefore, transmutation is
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not expected for these radionuclides. The peak corresponds to high cross sections for
Eu152, Eu154, and Ho166m.

Some neutron interactions are expected in these

radionuclides.

Figure 3.3 A comparison of the neutron flux in the fuel assembly, plenum, at the
unshielded tagging material and shielded tagging material.

3.3

IMPACT OF TAGGING MATERIAL ON REACTOR OPERATION
It is desirable for the tagging material to have little effect on the reactor

operations. To observe the effect of the tagging material on the reactor, the criticality
was analyzed. The effective multiplication factor was compared between the core with
the tagging material inside and the core without it.
discussions.

See Sections 4.2 to 4.4 for
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Figure 3.4 Flux spectrum at the identifier location overlaid with the ENDF/B-VII.0
cross section of each radionuclide in the identifier.
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4.

ASSESSMENT OF PWR WITH TAGGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES

4.1. THE PWR MODEL
4.1.1 PWR Core Details. The geometry used for the fuel was cylindrical pellets
with a diameter of 8.2 mm. The fuel pellets were modeled as one long pellet within the
fuel pin with a length of 366 cm rather than individual pellets with a length of 13.5 mm
each. The cladding material had a thickness of 0.57 mm with an outer diameter of 9.5
mm. Each individual fuel rod in an assembly had a rod pitch of 12.6 mm and a height of
400 cm. The reactor core contained 157 fuel assemblies with each assembly arranged in
a 17 x 17 array. Out of the 289 fuel locations, there were 264 fuel rods in each assembly.
The core diameter was 398.8 cm [10][18][19].

Table 4.1 gives the core design

specifications. A top view of the model of the whole core is shown in Figure 4.1 using
MCNPX Visual Editor Plotter Version X_24E. Figure 4.2 is a top view of a fuel
assembly in the core. Figure 4.3 is the side view of the model showing the fuel pins with
the fuel inside.
The fuel used in the reactor was uranium dioxide (UO2) with a density of 10.41
g/cm3 [12]. The fuel was enriched to 5%. Water was used as the moderator in the model
and helium was used to fill the gap between the clad and pellets, as well as the plenum
[18]. The cladding material was made up of ZIRLO whose composition was 98%
zirconium, 1% tin, and 1% niobium [20].
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Table 4.1 Core design specifications

CORE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
Temperature
Pressure

573K
155 Bars

Moderator

H2O

Coolant

H2O

Fuel

Fuel Pins

Assembly

Core

Chemical Form

UO2

Geometry
Diameter
Height
Enrichment

Cylindrical
Pellets
8.2 mm
3.66 m
5%

Cladding
Material
Clad Thickness
Diameter
Height
Geometry
Pitch

ZIRLO
0.57 mm
9.5 mm
4m
17 x 17
12.6 mm

# of Rod
Locations
# of Fuel Rods
Diameter

289
264
3.988 m
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Figure 4.1 x-y cross-sectional view of the core model in MCNPX Visual Editor
Plotter Version X_24E. The detail of each fuel assembly above is shown in Figure
4.2.

Figure 4.2 x-y cross-sectional view of the fuel assembly in MCNPX Visual Editor
Plotter Version X_24E. Each assembly contains 264 fuel pins.
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Figure 4.3 x-y cross-sectional view of the fuel assembly in MCNPX Visual Editor
Plotter Version X_24E.

4.1.2 Tagging Material Placement. The identifiers (tagging radionuclides) that
were used were arranged in a cylindrical wafer sized material with a 3 mm thickness. The
diameter of the identifier was 8.2 mm. The 3 mm thickness of the identifier was made up
of 0.5 mm thick layers of each identifier material as shown in Figure 4.4. The top of the
identifier was located 0.5 mm from the top of the fuel pin. To keep the identifier in place
at the top, an extra layer of 0.57 mm thick ZIRLO material was placed 3.5 mm from the
top of the pin directly beneath the identifier.
4.2. REACTOR OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS - CHANGE IN keff
To determine if the tagging material changed the criticality of the core, the core
was ran with the tagging material inside and ran without it. Figure 4.5 shows that there
was little change between the profile with and without the tagging material. Overall, the
tagging material had little effect on the criticality of the core. Figure 4.5 also shows the
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change in core reactivity, ∆ρ, due to the presence of the tagging material. The maximum
positive reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 ± 0.00256.
The maximum negative reactivity change on the other hand was at day 2000 with a value
of -0.00441 ± 0.00249. It should be noted that the reactivity effect is approximately
consistent over the reactor operation period. The error bars on the change in reactivity at
all the time steps are indicators of the consistency.

Figure 4.4 x-z cross-sectional view of the identifier in a fuel pin.
Each color represents a different identifier material.

25

Figure 4.5 Criticality of the core with and without the tagging material over time
and change in reactivity due to the tagging material.

4.3. TRANSMUTATION EFFECTS
In order to assess the impact of transmutation on the selected tagging
radionuclides, the identifiers’ concentrations were calculated at specific times over 2200
days of simulated reactor operation. These were compared with their concentrations in
the case of decay-only scenario. This was done to evaluate the additional loss of the
radionuclides by neutron capture and how the loss – if any – may impact the reliability of
the signals generated by the tagging radionuclides.
In a decay-only scenario, the rate of change of the tagging material mass is given
by
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 !"

(4.1)

Where " is the mass of the radionuclide at any time  and  is its decay constant. The
solution to equation 4.1 is:
"  "  

(4.2)

Where, m0 is the initial mass of the radionuclide.
However, in a reactor environment the rate of change is also influenced by
absorption reaction, the rate of change equation is:
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(4.3)

Where + ( is the energy dependent absorption cross section of the radionuclide and
,)*, (,  '  is the neutron flux with energy ( about location )* in the reactor at time  ' .
Equation 4.3 assumed that none of the radionuclide may be transmuted to another
amongst them. Nevertheless, the solution to the equation depends on the knowledge of
the flux function ,)*, (,  ' . By using MCNPX for the simulation, this equation is
solved to give " at the times steps specified.
It is convenient to designate the radionuclide concentration for the decay only
calculation as "  and the concentration which included transmutation effects as
"6 . It is expected that the additional loss due to transmutation would make "6 less
than " . Hence we may characterize the transmutation effect, 76 by the fractional
difference between " and "6 ; so that:
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8
8

9

 1!

9
8

(4.4)

Ideally, it is desirable for 76 to be zero or as close to zero as possible. This would imply
that the transmutation effect is negligible.
Figure 4.6 shows a transmutation effect for each radionuclide over the reactor
operation time. The 76 value is close to zero for all time steps. The worst case of
transmutation effect was on Eu152 at about 1.17%. This indicates that the loss of mass
was mostly due to natural decay rather than through neutron interaction. Since the rate of
decay for each radionuclide can be predicted, that characteristic could be used as a way to
identify the fuel. Through a combination of concentration ratios of the radionuclides,
unique signals can be made. A change of concentration in even one radionuclide denotes
a new identifier. It should be noted that the transmutation effect was evaluated without
cadmium shield around the identifiers. With a cadmium shield effectively cutting off the
thermal neutrons (see Figure 3.3), the transmutation effect should be mitigated with a
cadmium shield. Recall that the thermal neutron absorption cross section of Cd113 is
38% higher than that of Eu152. Given that only 1.17% of the transformed Eu152 is via
neutron absorption, then the loss of Cd113 via neutron absorption in the same flux
exposure should be about 38% higher. It is expected that the cadmium should not be
completely depleted during the period of irradiation.
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Figure 4.6 Percentage of tagging material lost over time due to transmutation.

4.4 EFFECT OF FISSION PRODUCTS ON IDENTIFIER SIGNAL DETECTION
Figure 4.7 compares the gamma spectrum of the identifier material at the
beginning-of-cycle (BOC) of the core, end-of-cycle (EOC) of the core, and after 30 days
post-irradiation. The BOC starts at day 0 when the core starts to burn the fuel, and the
EOC is at day 2200 when the core stops burning. Fresh UO2 was placed in the core at
BOC. Therefore, it is not expected that any signal from the UO2 should interfere with the
signal from the tagging material. At the EOC, the peaks are noticeably higher compared
to the peaks at the BOC. This indicates that the signal from the tagging material will be
compromised by the signal from the spent fuel. From Figure 4.7, the external signals
increases after 30 days of decay; an increase attributable to the beta decay fission
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products with the same atomic mass as the selected radionuclides but with lower proton
number. For these fission products to improve their proton-to-neutron number ratio, they
decay towards higher proton numbers, thereby resulting in the increase in abundance of
the selected radionuclides in the fission product inventory in the spent fuel. Nb94 signal
intensity increased by 175% at EOC and 478% 30 days post-irradiation. Cs137 saw an
increase of 12% and 89% at EOC and 30 days post-irradiation, respectively. Ba133
signal intensity increased by 25% at EOC and 111% post-irradiation. Eu152 saw an
increase of 46% at EOC and 209% post-irradiation. Eu154 signal intensity increased by
1260% at EOC and 4545% post-irradiation. Ho166m saw an increase 200% at EOC and
379% post-irradiation. The changes in signal intensities are summarized in Table 4.2.
The contribution of the external signals could be mitigated by shielding the tagging
material from the spent fuel signal with a material such as lead. Another approach to
mitigate this issue is signal refinement through the use of fission product yield curve to
isolate signal contribution from the fission products.
approaches may be employed for better result.

A combination of the two
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Figure 4.7 Gamma spectrum of the tagging material at the beginning of cycle, the
end of cycle, and 30 days post-irradiation.

Table 4.2 Change in signal intensity at EOC and 30 day post irradiation.
E (keV)

Nuclide

Signature

81
122
123
184
283
303
344
365
662
703
712
810
871
1275
1408

Ba133
Eu152
Eu154
Ho166m
Cs137
Ba133
Eu152
Ba133
Cs137
Nb94
Ho166m
Ho166m
Nb94
Eu154
Eu152

Secondary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Tertiary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary

Change in signal intensity (%)
EOC
30d Post-Irr.
242.96
397.86
45.59
209.10
1259.61
4544.81
199.97
378.54
27.52
117.84
104.06
333.92
104.47
199.98
25.01
111.11
11.75
89.27
8.38
78.17
4.66
557.56
58.43
34.36
175.33
478.44
-47.10
94.44
133.36
171.35

31
5. CONCLUSION

After reviewing over 200 radionuclides, six have been selected for the purpose of
identifying fuel assemblies:
•

Nb94: Metallic element, Melting Point=2477°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 15.8
barns, T1/2=2.0x104 years.

•

Cs137: Metallic element, Melting Point=28.5°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 0.25
barns, T1/2=30.7 years.

•

Ba133: Metallic element, Melting Point=727°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 2.8
barns, T1/2=10.53 years.

•

Eu152: Metallic element, Melting Point=822°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 12,796
barns, T1/2=13.54 years.

•

Eu154: Metallic element, Melting Point=822°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 1,353
barns, T1/2=8.59 years.

•

Ho166m: Metallic element, Melting Point=1472°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV=
3,609 barns, T1/2=1.2x103 years.

They were chosen based on the following criteria:
1. non-actinide
2. detectable gamma signature
3. medium to long half-life
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4. natural existence or ease of synthesis
5. high melting point
6. small absorption cross section.
Some of the selected radionuclides did not satisfy all criteria, but are deemed to
have possible remedy to the short-comings. For example,

137

Cs has a very low melting

point, which may be remedied by making the tagging material a Cesium compound such
as Cesium Chromate (IV) with a melting point of 982°C. Another example is the case of
Europium and Holmium radionuclides with cross sections up to 13,000 barns at
0.0253eV. The effects of the huge thermal cross sections may be mitigated by encasing
the tagging materials in other materials with high thermal neutron absorption.
A whole core model of a typical PWR was developed in MCNP. This model was
used as the basis for the evaluation of the performance of the tagging materials in the core
as well as their impact on reactor operation. The results indicated that there is negligible
impact of the tagging materials on the reactor operation.

The maximum positive

reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 ± 0.00256. The
maximum negative reactivity change on the other hand was at day 2000 with a value of 0.00441 ± 0.00249. In addition the effect of transmutation on the depletion of the tagging
material is negligible. The maximum transmutation effect noted is 1.17% in Eu152.
Hence it was concluded that the decay profile of the radionuclides is sufficient to
reconstruct the initial concentrations of the radionuclides, thus characterizing the fuel
being monitored.

A cadmium shield could also be used to mitigate some of that

transmutation effect by effectively cutting off the thermal neutrons. It was found that the
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signal from the tagging material will be compromised at the core EOC and beyond, due
to extraneous signals from the spent fuel. This could be mitigated via shielding and
signal refinement. It was noted that at EOC, the maximum change in intensity was
1260% which occurred in Eu154. Cs137 saw the minimum change of 12%. At 30 days
post-irradiation, Eu154 saw the maximum change in signal intensity of 4545%. Cs137
saw the minimum change of 89%.
Future effort on this project may include development of tagging schemes for
unique identification, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis for the reconstruction of the
initial radionuclide concentration. In addition further work could be done to optimization
of extraneous signal shielding, and develop schemes for signal refinement since the
success of the proposed strategy depends on the ability to profile the radionuclides used
as identifiers.

34
BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] E. S. Lyman, “The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Will it Advance
Nonproliferation or Undermine It?” Global Security Program.
[2] “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership)” World Nuclear Association, July 2012.
[3] P. P. Craig and J. A. Jungerman, The Nuclear Arms Race: Technology and Society,
McGraw-Hill College, 1990.
[4] U.S. Department of State, “<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/,>” Accessed 3 May,
2013.
[5] World Nuclear Association, “Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation,” April
2012.
[6] S. DeMuth and D. Lockwood, “Safeguards by Design (SBD) for the Next Generation
Safeguards Initiative (NGSI),” IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, Austria, 2010.
[7] R. G. Cochran and N. Tsoulfanidis, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Analysis and
Management 2nd Edition, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, IL 60525, 1990.
[8] European Nuclear Society, “<http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nppreactor-types.htm,>” Accessed 3 May, 2013.
[9] International Atomic Energy Agency, “50 Years of Nuclear Energy,”
<http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-4_ftn3.pdf,>
Accessed 3 May, 2013.
[10] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission “AP1000 Design Control Document”.
[11] E. M. Baum, M. C. Ernesti, H. D. Knox, T. R. Miller, and A. M. Watson, Nuclides
and Isotopes: Chart of the Nuclides 17th Edition, Bechtel Marine Propulsion Laboratory,
(2010).
[12] J. R. Lamarsh and A. J. Baratta, Introduction to Nuclear Engineering 3rd Edition,
Prentice-Hall Inc., Upper Saddle Rive, NJ 07458.
[13] N. Iwamoto “Jendl-4.0 Incident Neutron Data” JANIS 3.4 OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency.
[14] O. Iwamoto, “Development of a Comprehensive Code for Nuclear Data Evaluation,
CCONE, and Validation Using Neutron-Induced Cross Sections for Uranium Isotopes,”
Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 687–697 (2007).

35
[15] JNDC FP Nuclear Data W.G. “Jendl-4.0 Incident Neutron Data” JANIS 3.4 OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency.
[16] Nuclear Energy Agency, “<http://www.oecd-nea.org/tools/abstract/detail/nea1395/,>” Accessed 2 April, 2013.
[17] Nuclear Data Services- International Atomic Energy Agency, “<http://wwwnds.iaea.org/point2007/1KEV/ZA041094,>” Accessed 2 April, 2013.
[18] N. E. Todreas and M. Kazimi, Nuclear Systems Volume I: Thermal Hydraulics
Fundamentals, Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1990.
[19] Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC, “The Westinghouse AP1000 Nuclear Plant: Plant
Description” 2003.
[20] M. Steinbruck and M. Bottcher, “Air Oxidation of Zircaloy-4, M5 and ZIRLO
Cladding Alloys at High Temperatures” Journal of Nuclear Materials, Vol. 414 Issue 2,
July 15, 2011, p. 276-285.

36
VITA

Aaron Peterson was born in Houston, Texas.

He graduated from Tuskegee

University in May 2011 with a bachelor degree in aerospace engineering. While at
Tuskegee University, he worked at The Tuskegee Center of Advanced Materials (TCAM) and was active in the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
chapter. The summer of 2011 was spent working for the Tennessee Valley Authority as
an intern. He enrolled at Missouri S&T in the fall of 2011 to pursue a master in nuclear
engineering.

He

completed

his

master

degree

in

the

summer

of

2013.

